2. Methodology

2.1. Methodology overview

This study sought to understand the assumptions of donors in Jordan and Lebanon regarding the role of public authorities in local governance, particularly in low income neighbourhoods. Their assumptions are studied through a careful selection of grey literature produced by these donors and interviews with them and their implementing partners. This was done through a two-step process. First, documents were collected and analysed describing the perspectives of global development agencies and intergovernmental organizations on engagement with non-state public authorities. Second, documents were collected that described the policies of donor agencies in Lebanon and Jordan, primarily taken from four donor agencies and their implementing partners. Overall, a total of 73 documents were reviewed, all of which are in the publicly available. More detail on each step is outlined below.

In order to identify key donors and policy documents contributing to thinking around these issues at the global level, a search of key thematic words was conducted for the first stage[11]. Two additional documents were provided by the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs upon request. In total 21 documents were reviewed, covering the period from 2008 to 2017. This time period was selected due to the donor shift toward a new consensus on statebuilding in 2009-2009 (OECD, 2005). The collected documents were primarily global policy advisory reports, donor agency global strategies, and guides on the production and use of political economy analysis. These documents were produced by the following donors: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD), the World Bank, the United Kingdom Department for International Development (DFID), the Netherlands Ministry for Foreign Affairs (NMFA), the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and the German Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ). A list of them is available in Annex 1. It was not assumed that the perspectives of donors at the national level would be the same as at the global level, but global perspectives were used to provide context and codes for national documents, and to frame the country-level analysis.

Documents were then collected from donors working directly in Jordan and Lebanon for inclusion in the directed literature review. An overview of the document selection process is included in Figure 1. The Jordan Response Information System for the Syria Crisis (JORISS) database in Jordan and the OECD's Official Development Assistance tracker in both Jordan and Lebanon were used to identify the largest donors to each country.(OECD, 2018) The largest donors by total disbursements of 2016-17 were taken from these databases. These donors included USAID, DFID, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), the Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA), Agence française de développement (AFD), BMZ, the Saudi Fund for Economic Development (SFED) and the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development (KFAED).[14] We further included the Netherlands, as funder of this study.

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[11] Key words included "Fragile-states", "legitimacy', "state-building"
[14] The NMFA was included despite their slightly smaller footprint because this project was funded by the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO)

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Figure 1: The country-level document selection process

Donors were selected for inclusion in the literature review if their websites provided material that gave detailed insight into their assumptions, in English. USAID, DFID, NMFA and CIDA were selected on the basis of having the clearest material, including theories of change (TOC), national strategies, monitoring and evaluation frameworks. USAID and DFID are large donors with a focus on interventions in municipalities and have produced the greatest number of studies on legitimacy-making practices of municipalities. The NMFA is a small donor with a heavy focus on civil society interventions. CIDA is a midsized donor and funds the only identified intervention with an explicit focus on tribal actors.

Relevant programme documents and national strategies collected from donor websites were added to the literature database. For those donors that described programmes in detail (DFID, CIDA, and NMFA), all relevant programme descriptions were taken back to the earliest programme or to 2014. Before 2014 only DFID made documents available, and could therefore skew the sample towards their programming. Programmes were deemed relevant if they intervened in urban governance or in institutions on the local level (such as school capacity building) or if they intervened explicitly in local governance. These strategies and programme documents were then read to identify relevant multi-donor strategies, which were also added. Studies cited or commissioned by these programmes were also collected. For CIDA and USAID, the titles of projects and their implementing partners were used as search words to identify relevant monitoring and evaluation documents published by implementing partners. This method of gathering external studies is meant to confirm that the studies accurately represent the assumptions of donors. A small number of academic documents were also included to provide international and local context, and were identified by searching keywords relevant to the study and from the systematic review conducted as part of the PALM project. These documents were coded using Atlas.ti to identify assumptions about the legitimacy making of public authorities and theories of change linking public authorities to host-refugee relations.

Key informant interviews (KIIs) were also conducted with key donors to Lebanon and Jordan. The selection of key informants (KIs) also used the OECD data. Interviews were conducted by telephone and in person, and focused on the same issues as the DLR more broadly, as well as addressing specific policy issues not addressed by the documentation. The KII tool is included in Annex 3. In total, nine interviews were conducted, details are given in Table 1. In addition to those listed, interviews were conducted with a KI at UNDP Lebanon and the Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration Jordan (a part of the US State Department).

In total 53 documents were collected and analysed as part of the directed literature review. A breakdown of the type of document reviewed is given in Table 1.

Table 1 Documents collected in the literature review by type, and KI interviews conducted

	Programme descriptions	Implementing partner documents	National Strategies	Studies on legitimacy-making	KI Jordan	KI Lebanon
DFID/CSSF	9	3	3	7	1	1
NMFA	7	1	0	0	1	0
USAID	0	3	3	1	1	1
CIDA	2	6	0	0	0	1
Multi-donor	0	1	7	0	NA	NA
GIZ	Few relevant projects, limited information availability (GIZ, 2019a) (GIZ, 2019b).					
JICA	Focus on infrastructure projects in Jordan, no projects in Lebanon (JICA, 2019)					
EU	Limited information on projects, national strategies outdated(European Union External 2015)					
Kuwait Fund	No relevant projects (Kuwait Fund, 2019)					
AFD	Limited information on projects in English (Agence France de Developpement, 2019)					
Arab Fund	"The issue of impact on legitimacy of state and non-state actors is neither relevant nor considered in decision making." (Pers. Comm., 2019)					
Qatar Fund	No relevant projects (Pers. Comm., 2019)					
Abu Dhabi Fund	No relevant projects (Abud Dhabi Fund)					

Source: Own work

2.1.1. Gulf Donors

Contacting donors from the Gulf states was part of our methodology because their role in local politics in Jordan and Lebanon is poorly understood. The following state and international donors were contacted for this research: the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development, the Qatar Fund, the Saudi Fund for Development, the Abu Dhabi Fund for Economic Development, and the Arab Fund for Social and Economic Development. The Kuwait Fund's projects in Lebanon and Jordan consist entirely of loans for hard infrastructure projects, and are therefore unlikely to be based on a social logic relating to legitimacy or stability. They also do not maintain a Lebanon specific office. Contact was made briefly by phone, but then their offices ceased responding. IMPACT was not able to get feedback from both the Saudi Fund and the Abu Dhabi Fund, nor to find relevant country level information on their website. The Qatar Fund did respond to request for comment, but their programming in Lebanon and Jordan was restricted to the provision of scholarships, studying the effect of the crisis on families, and projects before the Syrian Crisis. The Arab Fund for Social and Economic Development provided a brief statement that their programmes are selected purely on the basis of economic feasibility and that no political or social issues are considered. The Abu Dhabi Fund's projects in Jordan were checked using the JORISS data and found to consist entirely of infrastructure projects carried out through ministries. This was confirmed through annual reports on their websites. Of the four gulf donors whose projects in Jordan and Lebanon could be checked for relevance, no relevant insights were found on statebuilding policy, stability or legitimate governance. Given their preferred sectors of intervention, it is unlikely that the major state donor agencies of the Gulf countries have a clear governance agenda in Jordan and Lebanon. Our analysis was based on those projects in the DAC and JORISS databases, which may not capture all donating bodies from the gulf region.

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2.2. Challenges and Limitations

- Much of this research is based on documents written by the donors themselves, including cooperation strategies and business case summaries. These documents may be intended for audiences in the donor countries, who have a limited understanding of the local politics of Jordan and Lebanon. It is possible that donors present a simplified picture of local politics in these documents to better engage with their readers.
- DFID does not release project documents "in some cases (…) for example where there is a potential security risk."(DFID, 2019) While the majority of relevant documents were available, it is possible that some policies were omitted, particularly regarding Islamist actors and Hezbollah.
- It was difficult to distinguish between interventions in rural areas and urban areas. The majority of refugees in Jordan and Lebanon live in urban areas, but most interventions targeted at local governance appear to not target specifically at urban areas, but cover both rural and urban areas. This study has included interventions that take place in both urban and rural areas.[25]
- It was intended to include the perspectives of gulf donor agencies in this document, but very little material on their policies or assumptions was found. Therefore this document describes the perspectives and interventions of western donors.

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[25] The Diwan project, implemented by Search for Common Ground and funded by CIDA, was included because it was the only project to directly address the role of tribes in municipal politics.

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3. Global Literature Review

Below we present findings from our review of global strategies from the development and humanitarian community on engagement in fragile states. Since this is a broad topic, we restricted the review to a few key topics of relevance to our analysis of Jordan and Lebanon documents. In particular, we explore the movement toward pragmatic peacebuilding, empirical legitimacy, and debates about what non-state actors should be engaged with and why. These findings are intended to frame and contextualise the observation of policy in Jordan and Lebanon.

3.1 PRAGMATIC PEACEBUILDING IN GLOBAL DONOR DOCUMENTS

Since 2009, Western global development discourse on governance in fragile states has taken a shift toward pragmatism, sometimes referred to as 'pragmatic peacebuilding'(Stepputat, 2018). This trend is a departure from the ambitious democracy and statebuilding projects of the early 21st century and marks a shift away from an exclusive focus on the state, toward engagement with non-state actors, and from normative to empirical legitimacy. For peacebuilding to become pragmatic means to move away from "state-centred international norms of what ought to be", and toward engagement with existing authorities, even if those authorities may be non-state or not align with liberal norms (ibid). The trend toward pragmatism occurred in part through the development and refinement of new concepts of "hybrid orders" and "empirical legitimacy" (Severine et all, 2009).

Current donor literature at the global level understands legitimacy as a quality of a political entity granted by the governed, when they trust in the entity to set binding rules. In this view, a legitimate government is based on shared beliefs and expectations between the authority and the people. Improving the state's legitimacy is seen as an integral part of creating resilient states - the new donor objective. To donors, a fragile state is the opposite of a resilient state. Fragility can result from either a lack of state capacity or a lack of state legitimacy, i.e. the state may be unable or unwilling to carry out basic governance functions. Like legitimacy, resilience has been understood in terms of the state-society relationship. In the donors' new vocabulary, resilient states have a better state-society relationship, in which the separation of the two is clearer than in a fragile state, but the state is also capable of building strong new connections with society (OECD, 2013) In particular, resilient states are defined as those better able to reconcile citizens' expectations of the state and the states' expectations of citizens.

3.1.1. FROM NORMATIVE TO EMPIRICAL LEGITIMACY

The trend toward pragmatism has prompted donors to revise how they understand legitimacy. The period 2008–2010 saw the international community acknowledge that ambitious nation-building projects, such as in Iraq and Afghanistan had failed in part because they were based on normative models of governance based on western liberal democracies, which failed to take into account the culture or political economy of the recipient country. (OECD, 2005; McCullough, 2015). Donors have transitioned from focusing on normative legitimacy, meaning the state's performance against external indicators such as similarity to western democracy and human rights, toward focusing on empirical legitimacy. Normative standards compare states to the ideal liberal state, assuming that the same legitimacy-making practices such as competitive elections, non-targeted service provision, and separation of the public and private spheres are relevant in all contexts. At the global level, donors recognize that these standards are alien to many developing states and have advocated for a new framework of empirical legitimacy. Empirical legitimacy is concerned with "people's perceptions of what is right and acceptable".(Moen and Sundstol, 2010). Normatively desirable traits such as fairness between identity groups or a high standard of service provision, will only lead to legitimacy if they match the expectations of citizens.(ibid) Common practices of legitimacy making, such as elections or ideological agreement, may or may not be important depending on contextual expectations of the state. The transition to empirical legitimacy is ubiquitous in the current development literature on statebuilding. The documents do not advocate abandoning the goal of rules-based governance and democratic rule, rather recognizing imposing foreign practices of legitimacy-making may fail to improve legitimacy in practice (OECD 2009).

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Improving state legitimacy is an integral component of donor's statebuilding objectives, but it has other benefits. Illegitimate states are more likely to experience political violence (World Bank, 2011) Citizens are more willing to cooperate with and contribute to a legitimate state (Moen and Sundstol, 2010) Furthermore, donors must be concerned with local perceptions of their own agenda. Donor's own legitimacy also has implications for their ability to operate effectively (OECD, 2010) as they too must build constructive relationships with the host society.

3.1.2. LEGITIMACY AND PUBLIC AUTHORITY

In this study we focus on public authority, a term rooted in academia more than development discourse. Public authority refers to the array of institutions within, around and against the state that are "able to define and enforce collectively binding decisions on members of society".(Lund, 2006) Often in the Global South, public authority belongs to a great variety of institutions, each performing some state-like functions and making some appeal to the state idea. The state itself is not a distinct, coherent institution, but a porous body comprised of many public authorities conjugated with the state idea. In different contexts, public authorities may be local councils, armed groups, vigilante groups, NGOs, CBOs, municipalities, or many other institutions that each claim to govern public life. The public authorities compete for resources and legitimacy, each producing legitimacy through practices such as representation, rituals and territory marking (Ibid). While donors more often discuss legitimacy of the state, all governing actors require it as well to transform force into authority.

Global donor literature contains many reference to the diverse authorities that exist in fragile states. Tribal chiefs, warlords, aid agencies, and religious leaders are all variously described as receiving legitimacy and exercising authority. The diversity and local specificity of public authorities has challenged the construction of single, global set of best practices. In some cases, the relationship between non-state authorities and state authorities is described as one of competition. The OECD writes "The majority of states in the global South (…) coexist with, or are overshadowed by other, competing forms of socio-political order; these have their roots in non-state, indigenous societal structures that rely on a web of social relations and mutual obligations". (OECD, 2011) Other guidance papers recognize that non-state authorities are the reality on the ground, and may need to be engaged with. The state may be able to enter a constructive relationship with non-state authorities in which legitimacy is shared between them, as a constructive path out of fragility. A policy advisory paper commissioned by USAID states "we argue that it is important for development professionals and state builders in general to recognize the reality of non-state actors and hybrid governing institutions, especially at the local level. Such actors, whether benign community groups or malign power brokers, and hybrids, such as participatory processes and warlord bureaucrats, have the potential in some cases for constructive engagement and in others to be spoilers"(Gleason et all, 2011).

The majority of donor statements recognize that the relationship between the legitimacy of non-state actors and state actors is highly contextual, and no single rule can be drawn about when engagement will or will not advance state building. Those public authorities which participate in the state's frameworks are more likely to be in a state of hybridity (legitimacy sharing) with the state. A common recommendation is to begin by studying the context to understand the relationships in place. DFID has a policy of including political economy analysis in each business case summary. Most policy documents do not acknowledge that constructive engagement may be necessary and productive with some less liberal non-state actors "namely the strongmen, warlords and power brokers (…) outside of central control, or who hold government posts but govern mainly through their patronage networks or private militias."(Gleason et all, 2011: page 14) While donors may wish to avoid engaging with such actors, early statebuilding often involves them. For example "warlords [of Afghanistan and Tajikistan] can destabilize the state or, if successfully co-opted, can participate in its consolidation. The second option worked in Tajikistan." (OECD, 2010: page 42)

3.1.3. INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTIONS AND LEGITIMACY

The extent to which the state should be the focus of intervention is also subject to some debate and considered contingent on the political economy of the recipient states. Some donor documents recommend an exclusive focus